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OF NATURE OF

C~-\Sr:

This appeal involves an automobile-pedestrian accident " .. herein plaintiff-pedestrian seeks to recover dam<lg'l)s for injuries sustained by her, "Then struck by an
automobil0 driven by defendant. The questions on appeal relate to the propriety of the trial judge in hi~
refn~al to give certain instructions to the jury and in
granting defendant judgment notwithstanding a Jury
YPrdict in favor of plaintiff.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This personal injury case was tried to a jury in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable :1\Ierrill C. Faux presiding. In defendant 'R
requested instruction No. 4 the trial judge was requested
to instruct the jury that plaintiff was negligent as a
matter of law and that the jury should determine whether such negligence was a contributing proximate cause
of the accident and plaintiff's injuries. The trial judge
refused to do so and the jury returned a Yerdict in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendant for the
sum of $3,550.00. After entry of the jury verdict, defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was granted. Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal from
the trial court's granting of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and defendant prosecutes his cross appeal from the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on negligence and proximate cause as he
requested.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The relief sought by defendant on this appeal is as
follows:
1. Order affirming the Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict entered by the lo,ver Court.
2. In the alternative on the cross appeal an Order
remanding the case to the trial court for re-trial, ordering the lo,ver court to instruct the jury as requested hy
defendant on his Requested Instruction ~o. 4.
2
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Tl1P aeridl'llt out of 'vhirh this action arose occurred
at approximatPly 7 :~0 p.m. (R 83) on June 28, 1962, at
thP inter!-'P<'t ion of Sixth South Street and Second East
~trPrt in ~alt Lake City, Utah (R 83, 100). Sixth ~outh
~t rprt runs east and west (R 84) and Second East runs
north and south (R 8.) ). At the time of the accident
Sixth South \\'as approximately 90 feet wide 'vith an int Prmittant 'vhitP renter line. (R 83) The street had no
other traffic lane markings but it "·as \vide enough for
t\\·o lanes of traffic in each direction (R. 85). The north
half of Sixth South just west of its intersection \vith
Second East \vas 45 feet 9 inches wide (R 85).
Second East Street \Vas approximately 90 feet ,,~ide
(R 85). South of the intersection it was marked \vith
t\\·o lanes for southbound traffic, two lanes for northbound traffic plus a left turn storage lane for automobiles tra ,·elling from Second East left onto Sixth South
(R·. 1~2, 128). The east half of Second East Street was
approximately 45 feet wide with the outside northbound
lane being 21 feet wide, the inside northbound lane being
14 feet wide and the left turn storage lane being 9 feet
8 inches \vide. The west half of Second East Street ""'as
approximately 44 feet wide, each lane being about 22
feet "~ide ( R 178). There 'vas a painted crosswalk across
Second East and Sixth South on each side of the intersection (R 94). The crosswalk on Sixth South \Vest of
the intersection \vas 7 feet 5 inches \vide (R 85) and
from the east line of this crosswalk to the west curb
line on Second East Street was 14 feet 3 inches

3
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(R 87). A semaphore suspended at the center of the
intersection controlled the movement of traffic in each
direction (R 101).
On the day of the accident defendant 'vas driving
his automobile north on Second East Street in the inside
lane. There 'vere no cars in front of him ( R 91, 169).
When he arrived at the intersection of Second Ea~t
Street and Sixth South Street the semaphore 'vas red for
traffic moving on Second East so he signaled his intention to turn left onto Sixth South Street (R 91, 170),
pulled into the left turn storage lane and stopped in obediance to the red light (R. 91, 170). When the light turned
green for him he negotiated his left turn west onto Sixth
South Street at a speed of approximately 5-10 miles per
hour (R 173). As he got into his turn so that he was facing in a westerly direction the sun struck him in the eyPs
and he reached up to pull down his sun visor. Just as he
did so, his wife, 'vho 'vas 'vith him in the car, shouted for
him to stop. He applied the brakes and immediately
thereafter struck plaintiff with his automobile (R. 91).
Just prior to the accident plaintiff ""'as 'valking
south on the west side of Second East Street (R 101) and
when she got to the intersection the light was green for
traffic moving on Second East. Not knowing ho"'. long it
had been green she "'"aited '"'hile the semaphore completed its green cycle and waited through the red exposure
so she could proceed when it turned green again (R 104).
Before proceeding south across Sixth South on the "rest
cross,:valk, plaintiff made an observation for traffic to

4
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tht• cast, \\·Pst, behind her to the north and to the south
(H 10~). ShP ohsPrved no automobiles coming from any
<lirection PX<'Ppt OllP car "·hich 'vas coming from the Routh
on Httt•onu East. '11 his vehicle "·as stopped at the intersP('tion in obedience to the semaphore but plaintiff obst • rvPd no left turn signal being given ( R 102), and canHot say \\·hether or not a signal 'vas being given (R 10;)).
\\'"hen the light changed green for traffic on Second East
plaintiff made an observation for traffic. on the roadwar in t\ach direction again, and saw none except the
n utomobile across the intersection from her on Second
Bast. She sa'v the automobile start into the intersection (R 128) and she then began to "·alk at a normal
gait in the cross"·alk south across Sixth South. .As
plaintiff proceeded across the street 'vith the sun to
hPr back (R 133) she was looking "mostly" in front of
her and to the southeast (R 130).

Plaintiff looked to the "rest to make sure no cars
"·ere coming from that direction (R 132) but did not
look to the south (R 132) and did not see the automobile being driven hy l\Ir. Hutchings, either directly or
through her peripheral vision (R 132). She never did
~ee the car from her first observation of it until just "a
fraction of a second'' before the impact (R 130) during "·hich time she "'"alked approximately 40 feet across
the street. The impact on the car occurred on the righthand ~ide of the front bumper of the automobile below the
light and 'vas merely a brushing off of the foreign material and dust and dirt from the surface of the bumper
(R 88).
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The collision probably occurred in the \\·est cross'valk on Sixth South, 39 feet 6 inches south of the north
curb line of Sixth South a.nd 17 feet 11 inches 'vest of the
west curb line of Second East (R 87).
Both streets are straight and level (R 97) and at
the time of the accident the road surfaces \\·ere dry, the
'veather clear (R 89) and there were no obstructions to
the vision of either party (R 90). The sun \\~as lo'v in the
western sky, making it bright and "quite glary" outside
(R 126).
At the time of the accident there \vas no other vehicular traffic on Sixth South or Second East other than
defendant's car; there was no other pedestrian traffic nor
'vere there any holes, obstructions or detours in the
crosswalk in which plaintiff was walking.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT C011j\1IT
ERROR ON RULING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDG~IEKT
NOTWITHSTANDING THE JURY VERDICT.
In considering matters on appeal, appellate courts
a bide by certain rules \\ hich have been laid do,vn dealing
\\Ti th the scope of review in rna tters before them. One of
these rules is to the effect that the judgment and proceedings in the lo\\·er court are presumptively correct and
7
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thP hurdPn is upon the losing party to sho,,· error. CooJnbs
,.. ['t'rry, ~ lTtah ~d 381, 27j P. 2d 680 (1D:>4), Burton v.
Z. (J . .11. 1., 1~~ Utah 360, 249 P. 2d il14. Another is that
wPre a. trial judge has passed upon a question and has
made a finding-, \Yhile such is not controlling, it is at least
t'ntitled to some consideration and should not be "?holly
ignor(\d in revie\\·ing the situation and attempting to see,
us objert.iV'ely as pos~ible, \\·hether reasonable minds
might differ. Toon1er's Estatr Y. Union Pacific Railroad
OoniJJa.ny, 121 Utah :~7, 239 P. 2d 163. In discussing this
problem in Kulbacki , .. Sobchrusky, 38 N. J. 435, 185 i\.
2tl R:~.) ( 1962) the Supreme Court of N e'v Jersey said:
\ Yhn t the trial judge must do is canvas the record,
not to balance the persuasiveness of the evidence
on the one side as against the other, but to determine \\·hether reasonable minds might accept the
e\"irlence as adequate to support the jur:· Yerdict.

1\nd in Hartpcnce v. Grauleff, 15 N.J. 545, 105 A. 2d 514,
the same court in discussing the same problem declared:
. \ trial judge is in a better position than an appellate court to decide \Yhether justice has been done
under the particular circumstances and the ''?eight
of the credible evidence. He sees und hears the
w·i tnesses, observes their demeanor and reactions,
none of ""'hich has life in the record on appeal. He
is in a position to know and equate all the factors,
including any error he may have made, and establish a basis "·hic.h leads to the conclusion that the
Yerdict 'Yas the result of passion, mistake or prejudice. His action should not be disturbed unless it
rlearly and unequiYocably appears there "?as a
manifest denial of justice under the la"'"·

7
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In the instant case, after canYassing the record and
after seeing and hearing the witnesses and observing
their demeanor the lower court held that plaintiff wa~
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of la\Y ,,~hich
contributed to the accident and her injuries. The guidelines set up for the scope of review on appeal should lw
applied here and the action of the lo\Yer eourt presumed
to be correct and it should not be disturbed unless clearly
and unequivocably shown by appeallant that the lo,ver
court's action \Yas error and that there ,v·as a manifest
denial of justice under the la"T·
Contributory negligence is conduct for which plaintiff is responsible amounting to a breach of the duty
which the law imposes on persons to protect themselves
from injury, and which, concurring and cooperating
with actionable negligence for which the defendant is
responsible, contributed to the injury complained of as
65 CJS, Negligence § 116; 10 B.
a proximate cause.
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice,
Perm Ed. § 6618, p. 3. A case should not be submitted
to the jury where the facts pertaining to an issue are
neither contradicted nor permissiYe of conflicting inferences but are clearly settled and permit only a single
inference. 65 C.J.S., Negligence, § 251.
Ordinarily, questions of negligence and contributory
negligence are for the jury, but a pedestrian who has
failed to exercise ordinary care for his own safety and
is injured by an automobile is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Clark v. Sn1itson, 346 S.\Y.
2d 780 (l{entucky).

8
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.\mong the cases in \rhieh the question of the negli-

gence of a pPdestrian in safeguarding himself from the
movPments of motorists has been decided as a matter
of la ". a rP the follo,,·ing:

Good , .. Behreudt, 321 Ill. App. 303, 52 X.E. 2d 826,
whPrP the pedestrian failed to look again after seeing
the auto1nobile. C'ioffari v. Blanchard, 320 l\fich. 518, 47
N. \r. 2d 718, \vhere the pedestrian failed to continue to
look. lVinklc r v. 1ll oore, 312 l{y. 235, 227 S.W. 2d 187,
"·here the pedestrian apparently walked into the side of
the automobile.

In Steu:art

Olson, 188 Wis. 487, 206 N."\'{. 909, 44
. \LR 1~~l:!, a pedestrian who saw an automobile coming
along the same street in which he was running, and \Yho
'vas struck \Vhen it turned onto a street which he \\.,.as
crossing, and who could have stopped before he reached
the place of danger, was held negligent as a matter of
la\\T: he having testified that he thought the ear might
turn into the cross street.
Y.

See also Herter v. Herschfield, 205 Cal. 625, 271 P.
1051.
"\Vhile the law does not view a pedestrian as contributorily negligent because he as not looked a certain
number of times before crossing a street or high\Yay,
Pueblo Transportation Compa;n.y v. Maylan, 123 Colo.
207, ~~6 P. 2d 806: Reiler v. Hart, 202 Minn. 154, 227
N.W. 405, yet a pedestrian crossing a street must not
only look before he enters but must continue to look as
9
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he proceeds and he will not be heard to say that he lookPJ
without seing what was approaching and plainly visiblP.
Ruchewski v. Wisswessu, 355 Pa. 400, 50 A. 2d 291. And
even though there is an ordinance or statute giving the
pedestrian the right of way at street crossings, such statutes and ordinances create a preferential but not an absolute right in their favor, Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah 2d
25, 361 P. 2d 516; Switzer v. Baker, 178 Iowa 1063, 160
N.W. 372; Harwitz v. Eurove, 129 Ohio St. 8, 193 N.E.
644, 96 ALR 782, and it is still the pedestrian's duty to
make diligent use of available means to avoid a known
or apprehended danger, or one that under the circumstances he should have apprehended. Ordeman v. TV atkins, 114 Or. 581, 236 P. 488. See also the Annotation in
164 ALR 117-124.
A pedestrian intending to cross a traveled street not
only has the duty to maintain a diligent lookout for approaching cars and to take notice of the condition of
traffic, but as the operators of motor vehicles must do,
the pedestrian is bound to make his observations at such
times and places that his lookout will be effective. Peterson. v. Schneider, 153 Neb. 815, 46 N.W. 2d 355; Flanagan
v. Slattery, 74 S.D. 92,49 N.W. 2d 57.
A pedestrian is not required to keep looking right
and left as he crosses the street but is required to exercise reasonable care while crossing the street in a marked
crosswalk and to continue to be alert and to safeguard
against injury, throughout his passage. Figlia v. lVisner,
150 Cal. App. 2d 109, 309 P. 2d 832.
10
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ahout to (•ross a high\\·ay on "·hich motor Yehi('ular truflic is to be expected must make reasonable
ohsl'rva.tions to learn traffic conditions confronting him,
look to the vieinity from which, \\yere a vehicle approaching, it \vould be an immediate danger to his passage, try
to make a sensible decision as to safety and generally
l'XPrcist.~ ordinary eare, including reasonable use of his
senses to avoid the accident. Christensen v. Berguzann,
148 Cal. App. 2d 176, 306 P. 2d 561.
()nt'

The rights of pedestrians in Utah to the use of the
public streets are the same as those of motorists, and
henee, the same general duties devolve upon both of
them. In the case of Hickok v. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190
P. ~d 314 the Supreme Court held that a motorist \\~ho
has the right of way across an intersection had a duty to
observe for traffic as he proceeded across the intersection. Inherent in the duty of continuing observation is,
of course, the duty to continually re-appraise the si tuation and to take \\"hatever action is necessary, reasonable
and prudent to protect oneself and others from harm,
injury or danger based upon the change in circumstances,
situations and conditions brought to the attention, by
continuing re-appraisal, of the person crossing the street.
Several cases involving automobile-pedestrian accidents have been decided in this State by the Supreme
Court. .L~lthough no case is exactly the same on its facts,
a few are similar though distinguishable from the in~tant case. Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d
680 (1954) 'vas an action by a pedestrian against the
driver of an automobile for personal injuries sustained
11
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when struck by the automobile in a mid-block cross,valk.
In that case, plaintiff and a friend were walking southward on the east side of Washington Boulevard, Ogden 'H
main street, between 26th and 27th Streets, in the evening
about twilight. As they reached the mid-block crosswalk, plaintiff looked north and saw a bus about one and
one-half blocks away and she decided to cross the street
to see if it was her bus. She walked west to the middle
of the street, stopped and looked north and seeing no
vehicles between herself and the corner, she took a few
steps westward when she suddenly became a'vare of
headlights to the north and was suddenly thereafter
struck by defendant's automobile.
Plaintiff's friend, who waited on the east side of
the street, testified that she did not observe any automobile between plaintiff and the corner. There was also testimony from an independent witness that defendant was
cutting across from the outside southbound lane to the
inside southbound lane, to where plaintiff was, as he proceeded along Washington Boulevard.
The Trial Court entered judgment for the pedestrian upon a jury verdict. Upon defendant's appeal the
Supreme Court held that the questions of the driver's
negligence and the pedestrian's contributory negligence
were for the jury.
It should be noted In the Coonzbs case that (1)
neither plaintiff nor her friend sa'v defendant's car, (2)
defendant traveled east on 26th Street and turned south
onto Washington Boulevard about one-half block north
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of plaintiff, (:;) there "·as a eonflict in the testimony as
to \Vhct hPr t hert' \vere any other cars on the street near

dPfendaut 's ear, ( -l) there \Vas a conflict in the testimony
as to \\'hat lane defendant \Vas traveling in and whether
he \\'HS (•utting aeross to the inside lane and, ( 3) there
was a confliet as to "·here the impact occurred on the
autornobile. Such conflicts alone are sufficient reason
to g-i Ye the matter to the jury for decision. X o such
conflicts in testimony exist in the case on appeal herein.
In the instant case there is not even a question as to
\rhether defendant signaled for a left turn because he
emphatically testified that he did so, and plaintiff testified only that she did not observe a signal and that she
couldn ,t say "Thether one was given or not.
In Coon1bs v. Pc,rry, the Supreme Court held that
the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence "Tas
one for the jury because the evidence \vas susceptible of
many findings, viz. (1) that defendant's automobile was
not on '': ashington Boulevard "Then plaintiff looked to
the north, (2) that defendant was so far a\vay from plaintiff "·hpn she looked that had she seen him she could
have a~sumed that he would stop because at the speed
he \\Ta~ traveling he could have stopped his car several
times over before reaching the spot w·here she \vas and
at the speed defendant 'vas traveling when she realized
that he \\Tasn 't going to stop it was too late, (3) inasmuch as plaintiff's friend looked and didn't see defendant's car the jury eould have found that a reasonably
prudent and careful person in plaintiff's position may
also haYe looked and failed to haYe seen, ( 4) there is a
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possibility that since plaintiff became aware of defendant's automobile all of a sudden that he may have been
driving without hi§ lights on until he reached plaintiff,
and ( 5) plaintiff could have looked and seen defendant and assumed he would stay in the outside lane of
travel where the jury could have found he was traveling.
Mr. Justice Henriod in his dissenting opinion, ho\\?ever, thought that there was no question but that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. 2 Utah 2d 381, 390-391.
In deciding the Coombs case the Court had the following things to say about its reasons for disposing of
the case as it did :
The salient point is that the plaintiff as a pedestrian in a marked crosswalk, had the right of W"ay.
The right of way rule simply means this: that if
t'vo persons are so proceeding that if they continued their course there would be danger of collision, the disfavored one (defendant) must giYe
way, and the favored one (plaintiff) may proceed;
and the favored one (plaintiff) may assume that
this will be done. It is, of course, recognized that
the right of way rule \vould not apply if, "Then the
favored one (plaintiff) approached the crossing
point (emphasis added) the disfavored one (defendant) was so close that in due care he could
not, or should not reasonably be expected to give
way. pp. 387-388.
Discussing this aspect of the case further at page 388
the Court went on to say :
In determining whether it must be ruled as a matter of law that plaintiff herself "?as negligent
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"·hich contributPd to rnuse hPr injury, consideration must he give11, not only the fact that she had
the right of "·ay upon "~hirh she could place some
reliance, hut also that a pedestrian crossing a busy
strPPt must be constantly vigilant for her O\vn
safety "·ith respect to all of the conditions around
her.
Going further the Court declared:
~ven

if a car is seen approaching, unless it is so
positioned as to constitute an immediate hazard
to her, she is not necessarily obliged to focus full
and undivided attention on that particular car and
so calculate her entire conduct as to avoid being
struck by it. She need not anticipate that the
driYer will speed, fail to observe, or to control his
c.ar, or fail to afford her the right of ''"·ay, or otherwise be negligent unless indue ca,re she obserres
or should observe something to 1rarn her of such
iniJJroper conduct (Emphasis added) .
..:\ ncl in summing up on the lookout and right of \Yay questions the Court said at page 388 :
This is not to say that a pedestrian may claim the
right of \Yay in face of danger. She must, of
course, be \Va tc hing for automobiles or other vehicles on the street, particularly from the north
"·here traffic \Yas most likely to come. But due
care requires that she also keep a lookout ahead
for other pedestrians, possible holes or obstructions in the street and at least remain a\\·are of
the possibility of other traffic, lest she be guilty of
failing to use reasonable care for her O\Yn safety
in regard to other dangers.
Upon all the eYidence produced at the trial of the
matter and upon the record before it the Supreme Court
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then gave its reason for holding that the contributory
negligence of plaintiff vlas a question for the jury:
Under the evidence here the jury may well have
found that when plaintiff looked to the north there
\Y·as no car approaching \Yithin a distance of immediate hazard to her, and in view of the considerations above discussed as to her right of \Ya~?
and the necessity of remaining aw'are of other
conditions around her, that her conduct in placing some reliance upon the observation she made
and proceeding westward across the street \Yas
consistent \vith her duty of ordinary and reasonable care for her safety.
Respondent herein earnestly urges the Court that
the Coombs case and the case on appeal herein are distinguishable on their facts and the factual circumstances
and conditions demanding the negligence of plaintiff
be submitted to the jury in the former case are not
present in the latter case and that the facts as revealed
by the record on appeal require that plaintiff be found
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of la\Y.
In
lows:

Coo~n~bs

v. Perry the essential factf.; are

a~

fol-

(1) The accident happened at dusk or t\vilight
making it difficult to see.
( 2) It \Yas dark enough for cars to be using
their headlights.
(3) Conflicting testimony as to defendant's position on the road and the point of impact on the
Ychiclc.
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( 4) ( >t hers failPd to
plaintiff.

st)t)

defendant's rar besides

( .->) Plaintiff's attention may have been directed

to other conditions and hazards on the
and in the crosswalk.

road"~ay

(6) Defendant was traveling about ten times as
fast as plaintiff "·as \valking so that it \Vas more
difficult to extricate herself from the position of
peril.
(7) Plaintiff had to make her observations as to
hazards over an area. of 90°, i.e., from due west,
directly ahead of her, to due north, directly over
her right shoulder, the direction from which defendant was coming.
In the case on appeal herein the essential facts are
as follo,vs :
(1) The accident occurred in the daytime when
it was not difficult for plaintiff to see because she
had her back to the sun, but \Yhen it \vas difficult
for defendant to see because he \Vas coming directly into the sun.
(:~)

Plaintiff observed defendant's automobile but
failed to observe the left turn signal being given
by him.
(3) Because of the direction that plaintiff was
\valking and by reason the direction from \Yhich
defendant \Vas coming, plaintiff merely had to
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hold her head erect and look where she "·as going
and she ,,. ould have seen tlefendant 's automobile
approaching her.
( 4) There 'vas no other vehicular traffic on the
roadway "'"ith the exception of defendant's automobile and since plaintiff had a red semaphore
protecting her from east-west traffic on Sixth
South she did not need to anticipate that traffic
would come from either of those directions and
harm her.
( 5) Plaintiff did not need to concern herself about
traffic turning right from Second East onto Sixth
South because she had passed the point "?here
such cars could be expected to traYel on the road"\vay before the accident occurred.
(6) There "\vere no other hazards or objects that
plaintiff needed to give her attention to because
(a) there "\vere no other pedestrians in the cross"\Yalk she was occupying, (b) there were no obstructions in the crosswalk, (c) there "\vere no
holes in the pavement.
(7) Defendant's automobile 'vas the only object
on fhe road that created a hazard for plaintiff and
the direction from 'vhich it came and the only direetion from "\vhich a hazard could come "Tas the
only direction to 'vhich she did not give her
attention.
(8) Defendant's car "\vhich "\vas traveling about
three times as fast as plaintiff "\\'"as "\valking creat-
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l'<l an immediate hazard to plaintiff as she ap-

proathed the crossing point.
(9) ] 1 laiutiff 'valked approximately 40 feet without ever having seen defendant's car as it approached her 'vithout slowing down.
Had plaintiff been in the exercise of due care for
her O\Vll safety as she crossed the street she could have
~(len or Hhould have seen that defendant was not decreasing his speed of travel and that he was reaching for the
sun visor in his car as he approached her. This would
haY(l put her on notice that defendant was unaware of
her presence and she should take the simple precaution
for her o'vn safety of merely slowing her gait or even
stopping \vhile determining whether defendant was going
to yield her the right of way.
If it is true that plaintiff had the right of \Yay \\"hich
she could rely on and \\"hich she could assume that defendant would give her until in the exercise of due rare
shP observed something to warn her to the contrary,
defendant asserts that no individual can be put on notice by observing some action to the contrary unless
sneh individual is making an observation and is in fact
~eeing """hat is there to be seen. Plaintiff was not in the
exercisr of due care because no action taken by defendant or failed to be taken by him could have put plaintiff
on notice that an accident was imminent because plaintiff
was not "yatching for the dangers around her or at least
not 'vatching for any from the only direction that danger
\Yould conceivably come.
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Based on this discussion defendant asserts that
Coontbs "· Perry and the instant case are different on
their facts and if from all the facts and circumstances
therein, the Coombs case presented a question for the
jury on plaintiff's contributory negligence, on the same
basis the case on appeal herein does not.
Mingus Y. Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d (1949)
involved an automobile-pedestrian accident \vherein the
pedestrian was struck by defendant's automobile and
killed. At the trial the lo\ver Court granted defendant a
directed verdict on the ground that the decedent pede~
trian \Yas negligent as a matter of la\v. The case was
affirmed on appeal. On February 23, 1945, at about 8:15
p.m. the decedent and his "rife attempted to cross Thirteenth East Street in an unmarked crossVt~alk at its intersection \Yith Westminister Avenue in Salt Lake City.
As they stepped from the curb and started easterly
across Thirteenth East the decedent neither looked to
his left nor right, but looked straight ahead as he proceeded across the street. He said nothing to her a bout
approaching traffic; she did not see or hear defendant's
automobile until it struck. The pedestrians proceeded
about ten feet across the street "~hen they \Yere hit.

The cross \Yalk did not run due east and \Vest but
slightly southeasterly and north\vesterly, so that if the
deceased \vere walking \vithin and parallel to the unmarked lines of the cross\\Talk, and \Vas facing straight
ahead in his course, his face \vould be turned slightly
a\vay and his back slightly to\vard the traffic approach20
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1ng from the north. Deftlndant 's automobile coming
from tltP north on Thirteenth East collided 'vith the
pPdPstrians.
Utah·~

~upreme

l~ourt

held that decedent \vas
.~nilt y of negligence as a matter of law for his failure
to observe for vehicular traffic before undertaking to
<'ross a road\Yay. Relating to the lookout question the
t 1<>Hrt said :
Jf ore <·on ,·incing that direct testimony that deceased did not look, is the further evidence that
deceased neither said nor did anything to indicate that he "·as a,,~are of the danger presented
by defendant's approaching automobile. He seems
to haYe been "~holly unaware of its approach.
Certainly he did nothing to u:arn his 'lrife, nor to
rescue either hiJnself or her jro1n their position. of
}Jeri! (Emphasis added). On this evidence, it must
he said as a matter of la'v that deceased either
failed to look, or having looked, failed to see \vhat
he should ha Ye seen. 201 P. 2d 495, 498.

Discussing the matter further at page 498-499 the Court
~aid:

'rhere can be no doubt that a padestrian 'vho undertakes to cross a busy street in a large city,
"~ithout first obserYing for vehicular traffic is
g-uilty of contributory negligence. And this is
true, even though he may be crossing in a cross,v·alk and haYe the right of way......A. pedestrian
crossing a public street in a cross\\~alk or pedestrian lane, although he may have the right of \vay
over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty to
obserYe for such traffic .... Of course \Ye do not
mean to imply that a mere glance in the direction
of the approaching automobile \vould suffice. The
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duty to look has inherence in it the duty to S<-\P
"\Yhat is there to be seen, and to pay heed to it.
At page 499, Justice vVade, concurring, had this to say:
Even had decedent looked to see if there "'as an
automobile approaching, this "\Yould not haYP exonerated him from negligence. As long as he
"\Yalked directly into the course of an approaching
automobile without taking any precaution for his
safety, it would make no difference 'vhethcr he
looked or failed to look for approaching traffic. If
he looked and inattenti,-ely failed to see the approaching car or absentmindedly failed to realize
his danger, or should realize his danger but still
continued on into the course of the car he ,,-ould
be in the same situation as to contributory negligence as though he failed to look at all.
The Mingu-s case has been cited for the proposition that one undertaking to cross a street in a cross
walk and with the right of way must initially make an
observation for traffic before proceeding across the
road,vay and if this is not done he ""'ill be guilty of negligence as a matter of la,v. Ho,veYer, that the case
also stands for the proposition that such a man must
maintain a proper lookout as he crosses the street by
making continuing reappraisals and gauging his actions
accordingly is born out by the quotations giYen above.
In the instant case plaintiff "\vas not faced 'vith the
problem of multiple appraisement as the Court indicates ~[rs. Coombs 'vas in Coo1nbs Y. Perry, but her situation is more analogous to that of l\Ir. l\[ingus be-
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<·ause thPy "·ere both faced 'vith a ~ingle appraisement

situat io11, i.P., there was only one object creating a hazard to then1 and that is the only thing they had to \vatch
at that time to keep themselves from injury. However,
t hPrP is one difference in the latter case and that is that
~lr. ~lingu~, whose back was to the hazardous traffic,
had to look back over his left shoulder to observe traffic and act accordingly, \vhile plaintiff herein merely
had to watch where she was going and she could have
seen defendant's automobile, constantly have re-appraised her situation without any inconvenience or
hazard to herself and gauged her conduct accordingly.
It is inconceivable that defendant's automobile
\vith its left turn signal light flashing, proceeding into
the intersection in the process of making its turn would
not have been seen by plaintiff who was looking almost
directly down the street and across the intersection
to\vard it, as plaintiff would haYe looked due to the
angle of her vision by reason of the direction of her
travel and that of defendant. It follows, that either
plaintiff did not look, as she said she did, or if she
looked, she did not see ""hat was there plainly to be seen.
Her failure in either respect ""as negligent.

POINT II
THE TRlA_L COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY _A_T THE TRIAL
OF THE "JLA.TTER IN ACCORDANCE WITH
DEFE~D . .\XT'S REQliESTED INSTRUCTIOX XO. 4.
23
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Defendant has filed a cross appeal in this matter
and Point I of his Statement of Points on Cross Appeal will be considered in his brief as Point II.
Instruction No. 4 of defendant's requested instructions is as follows :
You are instructed that the plaintiff, Loene Xelson, \vas guilty of negligence as a matter of la .w,
and the only question for you to determine is
\vhether or not this negligence was a proximate
or contributing cause of the accident \Yhich
occurred.
If you find that it \vas such a cause, you should return a verdict of no cause of action. If you find
it \Vas not such a cause, and you further find that
the defendant, Earl LeRoy Hutchings, \Vas negligent, which negligence was a proximate cause of
the accident, you should then consider the damages to be a\varded to plaintiff.
The trial judge refused to g1ve the instruction to
the JUry.
Instructions 1n an action are to be regarded as a
connected series and if considered as a \vhole they
fairly present the issues to the jury and state the governing la,v, error in individual instructions may be disregarded as harmless. Start in r. ]fads en, 120 Utah
631, 237 P. 2d 834. Error in regard to instructions ''Till
not be held reversible unless it results in prejudice to
appellant by injuriously affecting his material or substantiYc rights. I)rudential Insura/Yl·ce Cornpany v. Foster, 197 Okla. 39, 168 P. 2d 295, 166 .A.LR 1, Peck r. GHber,
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1:)-1- ( >r. 126, .>9 P. 2d 67:>, 106 . AI.. R 996. However, error
generally rPsults from instrnetions ""hich tend to mislead
the jury so that thPy reach a different result than they
\Vould havP rraehed but for the error, 5 Am. ,Jur. 2d, AppPal und Error, § 810, and in such a case the verdict
should he sPt aside or the matter re-tried and the jury
properly instructed .
thr contributory negligence of plaintiff, crossappellant adopts and includes under Point II by referPllCP, the argument and authorities cited and discussed
in Point I of this brief, and urges upon the Court that
the negligence of plaintiff is manifest. It is the contention of cross-appellant that the trial court should have
instructed thr jury that plaintiff was negligent in her
ronduct and, as a matter of law, should have taken from
thP jury consideration of that aspect of the case. Whether
or not plaintiff's conduct proximately contributed to the
accident and its resulting injury should have been given
to them to consider.
.As to

The case of Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 351 P.
~d 638 (1960) \Yas an automobile pedestrian accident
w·hich occurred on a street at a place other than a cross\\·alk. .A. t the trial, the lo\ver court instructed the jury
that the plaintiff pedestrian \\"as guilty of negligence as
a matter of law for her conduct in crossing the street
\vhere she did but it left the question of causation for the
jury's consideration. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that to be proper in that case. Cross appellant feels that
plaintiff's conduct in the instant case \vas as obviously
negligent as was that of the pedestrian in Langlois v.
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Rees and that the question of negligence and causation
should have been handled in the same "'"ay.
It is urged by cross appellant that the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury that plaintiff was negligent
and to leave causation for their consideration was error
for the following reasons: (1) If plaintiff "'"as, in fact,
negligent as cross appellant asserts, then the Court gave
an unnecessary and misleading instruction to the jury
when it instructed them to consider the question of her
negligence. Since negligence and causation ,,,.ere directed
against defendant, the fact that the Court permitted
the jury to consider the question of plaintiff's negligence
created an inference that plaintiff "'"as not or may not
have been negligent and this merely cluttered the issues
and confused the jury, (2) if plaintiff 'Yas in fact negli-:
gent, then the jury had no right to consider the question,
( 3) if plaintiff 'vas negligent as a matter of la"'"' and the
question of her negligence 'vas given to the jury for determination, they could and may erroneously haYe found
that plaintiff "ras not negligent at the time and plaee of
the accident, and if they erroneously found that plaintiff
was not negligent, then they would not have considered
the question of causation, nor would they haYe been required to do so since the Court had directed negligence
and causation against defendant. Hence, the one important question that the jur~r should consider would be the
one question that they would not consider, causing them
to reach a different result than they "'"ould have rea.ehed
except for the error by the Court in not having instructed
them properly.
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rrhis being the rase, permitting the jury verdict to
~tand "·otlld be injurious to defendant affecting his material and substantive rights.
To prevent a miscarriage of justice the jury verdict
should be set aside or the matter re-tried with the jury
properly instructed the second time to assist them in
their duties.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the facts as revealed in the record
and the law as discussed herein, the negligence of plaintiff is amply demonstrated and the action of the trial
court in granting defendant's motion for judgment not'vithstanding the verdict wholly justified. The judgment
of the lower court should remain undisturbed and in no
event should the jury verdict be reinstated.
Respectfully submitted,

I\:IPP AND CHARLIER

D.

Esq.
516 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
GARY CHRISTIAN,

. A. ttorneys for Defendant,
Respondent a;nd
Cross Appella;n.t
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